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Markets, Morals, and Practices of Trade: 
Jurisdictional Disputes in the U.S. Commerce in Cadavers 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study examines the U.S. commerce in human cadavers for medical education and 
research to explore variation in legitimacy in trades involving similar goods. It draws on 
archival, interview, and observational data mainly from New York State to analyze 
market participants’ efforts to legitimize commerce and resolve a jurisdictional dispute. 
Building on literature on professions, the study shows that how goods are traded, not only 
what is traded, proves integral to constructing legitimacy, thus suggesting a practice-
based view of moral markets. The professionals, including a group of “gatekeepers,” 
construct a narrative distinction between their own commerce and an implicitly less 
moral alternative and geographically insulate their trades from the broader commerce; 
creating in effect two circuits. Yet the professionals also promote specific practices of 
trade within their circuit to help them distinguish their own pursuit from an alternative 
course of action. The study’s findings shed light on the micro-foundations of market 
legitimization and on the role of morals in sustaining professional jurisdictions.
• 
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The notion that markets permeate society is nothing new; scholars have long noted the 
pervasiveness of markets in society (Zelizer, 1979; Hirschman, 1982; Fourcade-
Gourinchas and Healy, 2007; Sandel, 2009). Yet the development of legal markets for 
“goods” previously deemed off-limits to trade, such as human life and death, has proven 
surprising and raised anew the question of morals and markets. Despite calls for banning 
commerce in many goods, particularly human anatomical goods like blood, cadavers, and 
organs (Titmuss, 1971; Scheper-Hughes, 2000; Delmonico et al., 2002; Healy, 2004; 
Sanal, 2004; Steiner, 2006), the gradual emergence of such commerce testifies to the 
growing reach of markets. For instance, selling one’s eggs, plasma, or sperm is a fairly 
common and legal practice in the United States today (Snow and Anderson, 1993: 65-66; 
Almeling, 2007). The legality of commerce does not, however, imply moral legitimacy; 
instead, it brings new urgency to the question of what makes markets moral. 
 
A main insight from the institutional literature is that an institution’s structural features 
are integral in defining its legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1977; Zucker, 
1986; Scott, 1992). Put otherwise, an institution is deemed “valuable and worthy of 
support because its structural characteristics locate it within a morally favored taxonomic 
category” (Suchman, 1995: 581). By extending this insight to markets, scholars have 
shown that markets are often deemed morally legitimate or illegitimate depending on the 
category of traded goods (Spar, 2006; Almeling, 2007; Quinn, 2008; Satz, 2010). 
Knowing, for instance, that a car or a life is being traded is often seen as a sufficiently 
defining feature in passing moral judgment. At the same time, the actual doing of 
commerce or the micro-foundations of legitimacy tend to go unexamined (Hallett and 4 
 
Ventresca, 2006; Powell and Colyvas, 2008). Thus what makes markets moral essentially 
hinges on the category of traded goods. 
 
Though the strategic view of legitimacy offers a different answer to the question of 
morals and markets (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth 
and Gibbs, 1990), it also implicitly emphasizes the centrality of the category of traded 
goods in shaping legitimacy (see Suchman, 1995, for a review of the institutional and 
strategic views of legitimacy). The strategic view posits that markets are active social 
projects (White, 1981; Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992; Abolafia, 1997; Fligstein, 2002) 
and that participants’ efforts can also define an institution’s (here, a market’s) moral 
legitimacy. Yet the efforts are still mostly depicted as deployed in service of the category 
of traded goods. As an example, when a good is deemed illegitimate for trade, 
participants can deploy narratives to try and legitimize commerce. The results of such 
efforts tend to be seen as applying to the market as a whole (Zelizer, 1979; Barley, 1983; 
Zelizer, 1985; Sanal, 2004). For instance, the entire life-insurance or funeral services 
market is shown to gradually gain legitimacy (Barley, 1983; Trompette, 2008; Chan, 
2009a, 2009b). The category of traded goods remains a focal locus of legitimizing efforts 
and a key unit of scholarly attention. 
 
These combined theoretical approaches leave variation in legitimacy for trades involving 
the same category of goods largely unexplained. In this article, I draw on an inductive 
qualitative study of participants in a contested market to show that how goods are traded 
also contributes to morality. Building on the literature on professions (Freidson, 1970; 5 
 
Hughes, 1971; Abbott, 1988), the study offers what I label a practice-based view of moral 
markets to help us better understand what makes markets moral. The practice-based view 
has the potential to explain, for instance, why some trades in babies or life might be 
deemed morally acceptable whereas other trades, also involving babies or life, might not, 
thus challenging the categorical approaches of much past literature on morals and 
markets. The context for the study is the commerce in human cadavers for medical 
education and research in the United States. Commerce is here understood in its historical 
definition, namely, as the exchange between human beings of products of nature (Zelizer, 
2005: 293). The study relies primarily on archival trade data and on interviews with 
market participants, particularly the professionals facing a jurisdictional dispute in this 
commerce, to understand the pursuit of moral legitimacy. 
 
THEORIES OF MARKETS’ MORAL LEGITIMACY 
The Institutional View of Moral Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a central concept in the institutional literature. From its inception, the 
institutional literature has noted that legitimacy, not only efficiency, affects the survival 
of organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The concept of legitimacy and its associated 
survival-enhancing outcomes have since permeated much institutional scholarship 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). Organizations are now seen as competing “not just for 
resources and customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as 
well as economic fitness” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150). 
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While legitimacy can come in various forms (Suchman, 1995), an important form of 
legitimacy entails moral legitimacy, which is how legitimacy is understood in the rest of 
this article. Moral legitimacy reflects a positive normative evaluation of an organization 
and its activities (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). It is defined by what a community deems 
legitimate (Durkheim, 1973). As such, moral legitimacy reflects not whether an 
organization and its activity benefit the evaluator or fit his or her plausible cognitive 
frames but whether they are the “right thing to do” (Suchman, 1995: 579). Though the 
institutional literature has paid general attention to norms of appropriateness in markets 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Edelman, 1990; Dobbin et al., 1993; Lounsbury, 2001), it has 
not paid much attention to morality per se as a dimension of legitimacy. Nonetheless, a 
key insight from the institutional literature is that structural features are integral in 
shaping legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1977; Zucker, 1986; Scott, 1992). 
 
When applied to markets, this insight suggests paying careful attention to the category of 
traded goods. Many scholars studying morals and markets note similar normative 
inferences based on the categories of traded goods. Human life, death, and sexuality are 
typically seen as categories of goods deemed inappropriate for trade (Caprom and Radin, 
1988; Anderson, 1995; Carruthers and Espeland, 1998). Human anatomical goods are 
also often considered taboo to trade (Titmuss, 1971; Scheper-Hughes, 2000; Delmonico 
et al., 2002; Satz, 2010). Such a taboo is implicitly meant to preserve a line between 
distinct social spheres (Fiske and Tetlock, 1997; McGraw and Tetlock, 2005). For 
instance, contract pregnancy is regularly denounced as undermining “the dignity of 
women” (Anderson, 1995: 168).  As for the secondary market for life insurance, critics 7 
 
contend that it “violates the sanctity of life” (Quinn, 2008: 740). Comparing different 
entities or goods according to a common metric, in this case a market metric, tends to 
suggest that they belong to similar domains (Espeland and Stevens, 1998). And porosity 
between domains can put the entire category of traded goods at risk of commensuration. 
For example, a market in reproductive services can be seen as creating “adverse effects 
on all persons, not simply on those who choose to enter that market” (Caprom and Radin, 
1988: 63). Similarly, for female prostitution, “the open market might render an 
understanding of women (and perhaps everyone) in terms of sexual dollar value 
impossible to avoid” (Radin, 1996: 133). In short, an institutional view of legitimacy 
strongly links a market’s legitimacy to the category of traded goods. 
 
Although the institutional approach does not discount the theoretical possibility of 
sources other than structural ones also defining legitimacy, it generally overlooks the 
potential for these sources (specifically participants’ practices) to trump the categorical 
criterion. As an illustration, institutional scholars have noted how institutional 
entrepreneurs, through their repeated, often collective efforts can modify the ways 
institutions, industries, and markets operate  (Johnson, 2008; Battilana, Leca and 
Boxenbaum, 2009; Kellogg, 2009). For instance, assumptions on what structural 
characteristics of labor markets for surgeons might entail can gradually shift, due to 
reformers’ collective efforts (Kellogg, 2009). Participants’ efforts are not deployed in 
vain and can help shape markets, including, hypothetically, their legitimacy. Such 
legitimizing efforts can take many forms, yet most institutional research has focused on 
participants’ narratives (Hallett and Ventresca, 2006; Powell and Colyvas, 2008: 292-8 
 
295). Though participants’ practices are also posited to sustain legitimacy (Fourcade-
Gourinchas and Healy, 2007: 303-304), they have attracted less empirical attention. Thus 
in locating action mainly beyond the purview of individual market participants (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Dobbin et al., 1993), the institutional 
view still mostly emphasizes  “the way in which market-wide structuration dynamics 
generate cultural pressures that transcend any single organization’s purposive control” 
(Suchman, 1995: 572). In that sense, the category of traded goods “structures” a market’s 
legitimacy more than individuals’ efforts, particularly those deployed outside the 
narrative realm. 
 
The Strategic View of Moral Legitimacy 
The strategic view of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995: 575-576) seems initially to offer a very 
different answer to the question of what makes markets moral, but its research agenda 
also implicitly supports adopting a categorical approach through which to assess 
legitimacy. The strategic view posits that markets are active social projects (White, 1981; 
Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992; Abolafia, 1997; Fligstein, 2002) and that legitimacy 
can be constructed within markets (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Healy, 2007). This view 
can also be understood as a cultural approach to markets (see Mische 2011 for a 
discussion of culture and agency). Thus, market participants can make efforts to build or 
sustain a market’s legitimacy by shaping, for instance, perceptions of their environment 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).  
More specifically, in many if not all markets, narrative devices are extensively used to 
construct markets and legitimacy (White, 1992, 2008; Kennedy, 2008). For example, 9 
 
grass-fed-meat-and-dairy market participants rely on narratives to promote their market 
(Weber, Heinze and deSoucey, 2008). In addition, participants’ practices prove important 
in sustaining and legitimizing markets (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; Rao, Monin and 
Durand, 2003; Phillips and Owens, 2004; Hsu, 2006; Negro, Hannan and Rao, 2010). As 
an illustration, culinary practices, such as the way food is prepared, menus organized, and 
the chef’s tasks carried out figure preeminently in the definition of “nouvelle” cuisine 
(Rao, Monin and Durand, 2003). These findings help explain why the strategic approach 
has posited that alternate market features, generally linked to participants, can define an 
institution’s (here, a market’s) legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
 
Despite the allowance for a broader range of sources of legitimacy, the strategic view 
depicts market participants’ efforts as mainly deployed in service of the category of 
traded goods, thus implicitly acknowledging the category’s centrality in legitimacy 
construction. This assumption is most evident in research on morals and markets. More 
specifically, diverse legitimizing narratives can be deployed to build the legitimacy of 
contested markets (Zelizer, 1979, 1985; Barley, 1983; Sanal, 2004; Quinn, 2008) but the 
results of these efforts tend to apply to the market as a whole. For instance, U.S. funeral 
home directors rely on narratives that depict the deceased as living individuals to 
legitimize their pursuit (Barley, 1983). The more convincingly they frame their tasks as 
caring for the living, the more legitimacy the entire market for funerals acquires. 
Likewise, in many other settings, such as the Chinese life-insurance market, the Danish 
pornographic film industry, and U.S. men’s bathhouses, participants’ efforts are seen as 
benefiting the entire market category (Jensen, 2010; Chan, 2009a, 2009b; Hudson and 10 
 
Okhuysen, 2009). More generally, the legitimacy of a market in given goods is depicted 
as waxing or waning as a whole, in accordance with participants’ efforts. Put otherwise, a 
market’s legitimacy level varies in lockstep with its goods’ level of appropriateness to be 
traded. The market’s assessment drives the goods’ assessment, and vice versa. The 
strategic view again supports a categorical approach to legitimacy. These categorical 
approaches treat as anomalies “legitimate” markets in “improper” goods and 
“illegitimate” markets in “proper” goods. For example, the institutional and strategic 
views offer few conceptual tools to comprehend markets in sexual services that might be 
seen as legitimate. This study relies on the literature on professions to make sense of such 
anomalies. 
 
The Professional View of Moral Legitimacy 
All market participants engage to some degree in legitimizing efforts, but in contested 
markets closely associated with a professional group, professionals are particularly well 
positioned and motivated to make such efforts. Perhaps nobody struggles more with the 
question of morals than professionals in contested markets. Probably more than others, 
they have a vested interest in seeing their activities depicted as morally legitimate. Past 
research remarks that legitimizing efforts often appear to originate with professionals. In 
the life-insurance market, for instance, heads of trade associations have been shown to be 
instrumental in spearheading the adoption of narratives on protecting widows and 
orphans (Zelizer, 1979). Similar dynamics have been observed in the Chinese life-
insurance market, in which life-insurance managers and sales agents have proven to be 
instrumental in developing a “money management” narrative legitimizing commerce 11 
 
(Chan, 2009a). Likewise, in the French funeral industry, directors of large funeral 
companies are vocal in claiming that they cater to each consumer’s needs to justify the 
wide price range of their services and the legitimacy of the market as whole (Trompette, 
2008). These findings suggest paying close attention to professionals’ views of moral 
conduct in contested markets. 
 
For participants belonging to a professional group closely associated with a given market, 
the question of a market’s morality can easily become intertwined with the question of 
their professional jurisdiction. Professionals are often eager to shape the perceptions of 
legitimacy for their activities because their own jurisdiction is at stake (Freidson, 1970; 
Abbott, 1988). Their jurisdiction, or the “simple claim to control a certain kind of work” 
(Abbott, 1988: 64), is intertwined with how they and others view the work being 
performed. The work is tightly connected to their social identity (Hughes, 1971). For 
instance, challenging the morality of trading securities can easily be understood as 
challenging the morals of traders. Faced with jurisdictional disputes, professionals will 
use their power to retain their jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988: 134-142). 
 
In the literature on professions, morality is inherently linked to how tasks are done, not to 
what goods those tasks involve. As an illustration, merely trading transistors and resistors 
does not make a person an electronic salesperson. Instead, the salesperson’s ability to 
properly discount sale orders or provide clients with lunches, dinners, and golf outings is 
taken to indicate that certain individuals might rightfully belong to the profession, 
whereas others do not (Darr, 2006: 85-93).  As such, work practices are inherent elements 12 
 
of defending professional jurisdictions (Abbott, 1988: 60-68). While inscribing 
professional claims into the legal arena provides an alternate way to uphold a jurisdiction 
(e.g., in certain states, only those individuals who succeeded at a bar examination are 
qualified to practice law), professionals rely as well on recurring practice-based 
distinctions to ensure the legitimacy of their pursuits. Practice-based distinctions include 
task distinctions, but also distinctions in how activities involving similar goods are 
performed (Van Maanen and Barley, 1984; Barley, 1986; Nelsen and Barley, 1997; 
Bechky, 2003; O'Mahony and Long Lingo, 2010). Such an ongoing practice-based 
distinction also upholds and shapes the legitimacy of the work performed. By focusing on 
the professionals traditionally associated with commerce in cadavers, this study aims to 
understand what makes the market and, within the market, their jurisdiction moral. 
 
SETTING AND METHODS 
Commerce in Cadavers 
Historically, commerce in human cadavers was created by medical schools that trained 
future physicians. Most physicians undergo training in anatomy that requires the 
dissection of a cadaver. Finding an adequate supply of cadavers for this purpose often 
poses an ongoing challenge (Baumel, 1968; Dasgupta, 2004). The recent advent of 
anatomical training software does not seem to have dampened the demand for cadavers 
(Prentice, 2005). Other health-care fields, such as reconstructive dentistry and osteopathic 
medicine, also increasingly rely on cadavers or cadaver parts (jaws and joints, 
respectively) for initial training. And the continuing medical education of practicing 
professionals can often require cadavers or parts as well. For instance, medical device 13 
 
manufacturers regularly invite surgeons to training sessions in which they test new 
instruments on human remains (Gawande, 2002: 27). Overall, the demand for cadavers 
appears to be growing but is hard to estimate. 
 
The supply of cadavers is slightly easier to assess. There is no federal monitoring of 
whole-body donation, but estimates suggest that the total number of U.S. whole-body 
donations approximated 20,000 in 2006 (Becker and Elías, 2007). The U.S. supply is 
controlled by close to 150 academically housed whole-body-donation programs (State 
Anatomical Board of Florida, 2006) and a dozen independent ventures, both for-profit 
and non-profit organizations. Academically housed programs are defined here as 
programs housed in facilities that focus primarily on higher education or research. By 
contrast, independent ventures are not affiliated with higher education or research 
institutions.
1 Staff members of academically housed programs historically formed an 
“exclusive group of individuals applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular 
cases” (here, whole-body donations) and therefore can be considered a profession 
(Abbott, 1988: 318). 
 
Current U.S. legislation governing the commerce in cadavers constrains the purchase and 
sale of cadavers while facilitating their acquisition and transfer to meet medical demands 
(Madoff, 2010: 22-28). Since 1968, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), adopted 
by every U.S. state, has provided a legal framework for such commerce (National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1968). The act created a 
framework for obtaining donor’s consent and prioritized the rights of next of kin to 14 
 
bequeath anatomical gifts of decedents who did not specify their wishes. A 1987 revision 
of the UAGA, enacted by most U.S. states, made it a felony to “knowingly, for valuable 
consideration, purchase or sell a [body] part for transplantation or therapy, if removal of 
the part is intended to occur after the death of the decedent” (National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1987). To allow procurement programs to 
recover part of their costs, however, the 1987 act excluded “the reasonable payment [by 
users] for the removal, processing, disposal, preservation, quality control, storage, 
transportation, or implantation of a part.” This provision allowed providers (in particular, 
independent ventures) to require “reasonable” payment for their services. 
 
Though prohibitions on the purchase and sale of cadavers (as opposed to body parts), and 
for purposes other than transplant or therapy (such as education and research), were not 
spelled out in the act, its scope was usually interpreted as encompassing cadaver 
procurement, regardless of purpose. The 2006 revision of the UAGA made this loophole 
explicit by excluding the body in its entirety from the definition of a part: “The term 
[part] does not include the whole body” (National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, 2006). As the California Supreme Court had previously clarified, 
“Given the current provisions of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), there is no 
basis to conclude that there is a general public policy in this state prohibiting hospitals or 
medical centers from giving, or prohibiting patients from receiving, valuable 
consideration for body parts which are to be used for medical research or the 
advancement of medical science” (Moore v. Regents of University of California, 1990, 51 
Cal. 3d 120; 271 Cal. Rptr. 146; 793 P.2d 479). Thus the purchase or sale of body parts 15 
 
or cadavers for purposes other than transplantation and therapy is legal as long as proper 
consent has been obtained. This legal framework has lent encouragement to the 
commerce in cadavers but has also given rise to a new jurisdictional dispute. 
 
Jurisdictional Dispute in Commerce in Cadavers 
Cadaver procurement in the United States operated historically mostly “outside of the 
legal process or in the shadows of law” and was commonly referred to as “body-
snatching” (Goodwin, 2006: 11). Those responsible for procuring corpses for medical 
schools often resorted to disinterring cadavers or paying others to do so (Sappol, 2002). 
Procuring cadavers generally proved to be illegal, was mostly deemed illegitimate, and 
hardly constituted a profession. In 1968, the UAGA’s definition of the legal parameters 
for donations provided those involved in commerce in cadavers with a new legal basis for 
their pursuit. Though anatomical donations, like cadaveric organ transfers, mostly failed 
“to become routinized within the collective lay imagination” (Sharp, 2006: 41), they 
gained broader acceptance with the act’s adoption. Gradually, leaders from major faiths 
also endorsed whole-body donations as acts in accordance with their respective traditions 
and, more importantly, as signs of generosity (Mitford, 1998). Inspired by such progress, 
academically housed staff members formed in 1991 a “Willed Body Directors” shared 
interest group at the American Association of Clinical Anatomists (AACA) (Cahill and 
Payer, 1991), as most academic programs were run (and still are) by clinical anatomists 
holding a Ph.D. in anatomical sciences, physiology, or physical anthropology. These 
changes provided new visibility and legitimacy for the profession. 
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Starting in the 1980s, independent ventures, with names like Life Legacy and Science 
Care, took advantage of the opportunity offered by the legislation governing the 
commerce in cadavers to set up operations and source in the same geographies as 
academically housed programs. Gradually, the scale of their operations made them key 
players in commerce, prompting the Cato Institute to publish an article praising the 
commerce in cadavers as an example of an unregulated national market (Harrington and 
Sayre, 2006). By 2007, the two largest U.S. independent ventures were each securing 
several thousand donations per year as compared with a maximum of several hundred for 
the most successful academically housed programs. While academically housed programs 
received donations locally, independent ventures often reached beyond their home base. 
A study of a typical venture found, for instance, that the overwhelming majority of 
donations (82 percent) came from out of state (Anteby and Hyman, 2008: 965). 
 
Professionals perceived the rise of independent ventures as a direct threat. Most ventures 
were run by individuals with no medical training, and professionals vehemently resisted 
early attempts by ventures’ staff to join their gatherings. In a few states, local 
professionals even asked health officials to investigate the ventures’ facilities to attest to 
their legality. Professionals also issued a policy statement noting their concern about 
“independent entrepreneurs, acting as third-party brokers” and “certain donor programs 
that appear to be operating for budget enhancement” (Cahill and Marks, 1991: 232). Like 
body-snatchers in the past, independent ventures’ motives and character were depicted by 
professionals as distinct from those of academically housed programs (Associated Press, 
2004; Davis, 2004; Lucas, 2006). Yet the difference between the academically housed 17 
 
programs’ and the ventures’ pursuits was not always apparent. As an illustration, a recent 
request for proposals for cadavers issued by the University of California System (required 
by the level of funding involved) was open to independent ventures and academic 
programs alike (Regents of the University of California, 2008). With their legitimacy 
only in its infancy, professionals were suddenly confronted with a jurisdictional dispute 
that echoed their worst fear, namely, being associated with the historical body-snatcher 
image (evoked by the new ventures) that their profession had tried hard to distance itself 
from. 
 
Research Design 
In this research, I used in-depth analysis of a contested market in a given geography to 
understand how markets are rendered moral from the participants’ perspective. Any U.S. 
state might seem a suitable setting to study the commerce in cadavers, but few states keep 
extensive records of commerce. In 2007, however, the state of New York established an 
exhaustive legal reporting obligation (starting with the prior year) for “acquisition and 
use” of human cadavers. I therefore made a methodological choice to focus on that state 
and on the data from a given year, 2007. I chose the second year of obligatory reporting 
because data from the first year, 2006, included at least one reporting error, suggesting 
that some programs might need an initial year to perfect their reporting procedures, 
although analyses of the 2006 data support the 2007 findings reported here.  The 
dynamics of New York’s commerce in cadavers were typical in many ways of what could 
be found elsewhere. New York’s legislature enacted a classic version of the UAGA, its 
medical schools have historically procured most donations, and a few independent 18 
 
ventures have been licensed to operate in the state. At the same time, professionals 
seemed more active and numerous in New York than in other states and were able to 
strongly limit independent ventures’ in-state activities. In other states, such as Maryland 
and Minnesota, only a limited number of individuals seemed to have spearheaded efforts 
to legitimize commerce in cadavers. Thus New York represented a geography in which 
the efforts of professionals were likely to be more salient than in other settings. 
 
Data Sources 
I used three data sources to understand the efforts made by participants in the commerce 
in cadavers: archival data on the acquisition and use of cadavers in New York, interviews 
with market participants, and observations during program visits. 
 
Archives. A state license is required to acquire and use cadavers in New York; 
fifty-three programs were licensed in 2007; Table 1 provides the details. All “non-
transplant anatomic banks” licensed in New York to acquire and use whole bodies must 
submit activity reports to the New York State Department of Health. Failure to report 
such activities could lead to the loss of a license and consequent inability to operate in the 
state. “Non-transplant anatomic banks” are defined by New York State law as “any 
person or facility that solicits, retrieves, performs donor selection and/or testing, 
preserves, transports, allocates, distributes, acquires, processes, stores or arranges for the 
storage of non-transplant anatomic parts, including whole bodies, body segments, organs 
or tissues from living or deceased donors, for education and/or research purposes” (State 19 
 
of New York Public Health Law, 2007). Access to these reports was crucial in compiling 
a full picture of cadaver commerce in the state.  
[Insert Here Table 1] 
 
Interviews. To understand how the commerce in cadavers operated, a research 
assistant and I interviewed, respectively, 12 and 36 individuals; totaling 48 interviews. 
Table 2 provides details. The vast majority of the interviewees (38) were staff members 
at academically housed programs whom I label “professionals.” The remaining 
interviewees were staff members of independent ventures and of the Office of the Chief 
Medical Examiner, as well as “industry” insiders, namely, two corporate users of 
cadavers (automotive-industry employees involved in crash-test research), two funeral 
directors often asked to transport cadavers, and an airline executive who specialized in 
the transportation of human remains. The interviews typically lasted 45 minutes and were 
conducted on site or by phone, often after face-to-face introductions at professional 
meetings attended by many staff members of academically housed programs. Interviews 
were organized around a consistent set of questions but were also tailored to respondents’ 
areas of expertise and to the nature of their involvement in commerce. We asked all 
interviewees to provide examples of typical cadaver-acquisition-and-use decisions. 
Three-quarters of the interviews were recorded, and extensive notes were taken during all 
of them. 
 
To form a sample of interviewees, we first contacted all individuals listed as contacts in 
the activity reports submitted to the New York State Department of Health. Of the 53 20 
 
individuals contacted, 28 agreed to be interviewed. Non-respondents did not appear to 
differ significantly from respondents with respect to program type or size. Though it is 
possible that programs refused interviews because they had failed to report their data 
accurately, the likelihood seems low: because I triangulated programs’ replies, an entire 
set of “non-accurate” respondents would have had to decline interviews. Of the five 
independent ventures licensed in New York, the founders from three agreed to be 
interviewed. Another venture not licensed in New York also agreed to provide an 
interview. Most independent ventures appeared to operate on an identical model and were 
divided approximately equally between non-profit and for-profit organizations. To add 
robustness to the data, I also conducted interviews with out-of-state professionals selected 
via a two-step process. First, I approached randomly selected participants in sessions on 
anatomical donations at the principal annual meeting of clinical anatomists, explained my 
project, and inquired whether they might later agree to be interviewed; most respondents 
agreed. Second, I asked interviewees to suggest other potential interviewees. This process 
yielded a random sample of New York commerce participants and a snowball sample of 
participants in the commerce in cadavers nationwide. 
[Insert Here Table 2] 
 
  Observations. I conducted on-site observations for a total of 15 days in six 
cadaver-procurement programs to familiarize myself with their operations. The sampling 
of observations was a convenience sample. All interviewees were asked at the end of the 
interviews whether they would permit day-long observations at their site. I observed both 
smaller and larger programs, as well as both academically housed and independent 21 
 
programs. I took extensive notes on the activities of staff members, ranging from 
program directors to administrative assistants. I also attended three consecutive annual 
conferences of the American Association of Clinical Anatomists (AACA), a professional 
association dedicated to advancing the art and science of clinical anatomy. At the AACA 
conferences, I attended and took extensive notes at the Anatomical Services Committee’s 
session, which focuses on whole-body donations, and several presentations organized by 
that committee. Almost half of all U.S. academically housed programs participated in the 
committee’s activities. Each of the three years that I attended, 50-100 participants came 
to the session. These sessions were the sole national annual venues for programs to 
exchange practices and ideas about the acquisition and use of cadavers. 
 
Data Analysis 
I began the analysis by reading and coding the interview data for ways in which 
interviewees described cadaver trades, in keeping with grounded theory guidelines 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles and Huberman, 1994), including constant comparison. 
As an illustration, I treated any issues that participants repeatedly voiced in reference to 
cadaver trades as salient attributes of commerce. I gradually tracked the content of 
recurring themes, such as the legitimacy of trades, donors’ consent, and the dissection of 
cadavers prior to use. As themes emerged, I returned to previously analyzed descriptions 
of trades to reexamine them according to the new themes. In parallel, I noted the 
interviewees’ profiles alongside the ways trades were described. Identifying and 
comparing their contents across trade descriptions were iterative processes (Golden-
Biddle, 2001: 45-62).  To strengthen the analyses, an independent coder also read all the 22 
 
transcribed interviews to analyze recurring themes; we then compared themes, reread the 
interviews in light of each other’s insights, and fine-tuned our shared understanding of 
the narratives. A second step in the analyses led me to examine actual patterns of cadaver 
trades in New York, paying close attention to the profiles of involved parties. I used 
archival data to reconstruct a map of commerce that identified the main cadaver-
procurement and recipient programs and quantified flows of cadavers in the state. Finally, 
I also recorded observational data to identify key steps in the procurement and use of 
cadavers and to capture the nature of a typical day at a given program. In addition, 
annual-meeting field notes proved important for contextualizing some findings. Though 
many of these observations are not detailed here, they contributed substantially to my 
general knowledge of the commerce in cadavers. 
 
FINDINGS 
The findings detail how the professionals traditionally entrusted with commerce in 
cadavers handle the jurisdictional dispute. First, they rely on narrative distinctions to 
distinguish their own pursuit from an alternative sphere of commerce. Second, they 
geographically insulate their pursuit from an alternate one by trading a fair number of 
cadavers among themselves. A particular group of professionals—those I label 
“gatekeepers”—played a key role in maintaining such insularity. Yet besides narrating 
their work differently and trading select cadavers, the professionals, particularly 
gatekeepers, also promote proper ways of trading cadavers. The practice-based 
distinctions made by professionals between proper and improper commerce in similar 
goods suggest that how cadavers are traded is central to building legitimacy. 23 
 
 
Distinguishing Spheres of Commerce via Narratives 
All interviewed professionals perceived themselves as operating within a “world” or 
“sphere” distinct from that of programs and individuals engaged in what they called 
“unethical” and “illegal” commerce. Characterization of the other sphere as immoral was 
widespread among academically housed respondents. As one professional put it, “for the 
most part willed-body programs are run on a pretty legitimate basis, [but] you are going 
to find a rascal in every business once and a while.” In New York in particular, all 
professionals drew a similar narrative distinction between spheres.
2 The other programs 
were described as “outsiders” or as operating “off the radar.” It did not matter that some 
“immoral” programs operated legally. Academically housed interviewees saw these 
programs as outsiders because they “duped naïve donors and their families about their 
motives.” Operating off the radar suggested not only that the immoral sphere might 
engage in illegal practices but also that it might deceive potential donors and their 
families about its goals. While professionals saw themselves as pursing “higher goals,” 
participants in the immoral sphere were said to engage in commerce “only for 
themselves.” The perceived egotistic goals of independent ventures troubled the 
professionals and led them to condemn such ventures on moral grounds. In the eyes of 
academically housed interviewees, the independent entrepreneurs epitomized the 
immoral sphere. 
 
Evidence of past misconduct was usually invoked in those instances to illustrate what 
was wrong with the immoral sphere. For example, “random occurrences that hit the press 24 
 
around the country of, you know, improper use of cadavers or body parts” were cited as 
proof of an immoral sphere’s existence. What one interviewee called “the New Jersey 
example of stolen body parts”—an incident in which the bones of the television 
commentator Alistair Cook were stolen from a funeral home and sold for profit—was 
frequently mentioned as an example of how commerce could go wrong (for a description 
of the incident, see Scheper-Hughes, 2006). Similarly, independent ventures’ marketing 
letters to funeral homes suggesting that families might “save money” if they agreed to 
“donate their loved one to science” were seen as evidence of wrongdoing. The funeral 
homes would be reimbursed for their transportation and cremation costs, and might 
therefore encourage families with limited means to consider this option. These letters 
reinforced the idea that ventures acted “only for themselves.” 
 
Whereas many independent ventures’ interviewees downplayed the distinction between 
spheres and aspired to be perceived as an “equivalent option” to an academically housed 
donation, some also voiced pride in belonging to an alternate sphere. They questioned the 
morality of academically housed programs “turning down some cadavers that could be 
put to good use” and “not fully utilizing” the ones they accepted. The ventures’ staff 
emphasized that their cadavers were “extensively” used and that multiple recipients 
benefited from the donation. Moreover, all independent venture interviewees considered 
the quality of services they provided to families and to specimen-users higher than those 
offered by academically housed programs. For instance, the ability to return cremated 
ashes to the family within months or to answer any users’ needs on the spot was seen as 25 
 
evidence of superior service. Thus the academically housed programs lacked what the 
ventures saw as “organizational” skills. 
 
Though generally described as distinct by professionals, the two spheres of commerce 
exhibited some porosity. For one thing, professionals acknowledged that problems they 
attributed to the other sphere could also arise in their own ranks. Several academically 
housed programs mentioned the “temptation to do things they should not be doing” when 
speaking about academic colleagues. As one professional pointed out, some recent 
scandals involving cadavers implicated staff members at academically housed programs 
(not independent ventures) who had sold specimens for profit.
3 Furthermore, some 
professionals acknowledged the need filled by independent ventures. One such 
interviewee said that he occasionally referred families to these ventures when they 
inquired about donating a recently deceased relative he did not want to accept. He cited 
such ventures by name, without endorsing any of them, to “help the family” in “pursuing 
the path they had chosen.” Despite the porosity, the narrative contrast between spheres 
was generally maintained. Overall, this contrast strengthened the distinction between the 
professionals’ pursuit and an alternative course of action. 
 
Geographically Insulating Spheres of Commerce  
While professionals were establishing a narrative distinction between their activities and 
the broader market for cadavers, they were also actively engaging in commerce by 
trading a relatively high number of cadavers in New York. To avoid confusion in spheres 
and defend their jurisdiction, professionals located in New York opted to almost always 26 
 
trade only those cadavers secured in state by other academically housed programs. Such a 
strategy helped them trade cadavers while seeming to oppose market developments. 
Trades with out-of-state programs, particularly independent ventures, even those licensed 
in New York, were infrequent. Given how commerce in cadavers operates in the United 
States, these patterns point to purposeful trading practices. Archival data on cadaver 
acquisition in New York suggest that in-state programs essentially operated in a regional 
submarket. Of the 1,694 cadavers secured in 2007 by all non-transplant anatomical banks 
located in New York, only 31 (1.8 percent) came from outside the state. Moreover, these 
few out-of-state cadavers came from another academically housed program, not from 
independent ventures. Thus most cadavers acquired by in-state programs were procured 
locally and from academically housed programs, despite the availability of such 
specimens from out-of-state independent ventures. A similar insularity prevailed in 
specimen-usage patterns as well; in-state cadaver acquisitions were used exclusively 
within the state. 
 
By contrast, independent ventures tended to acquire and send cadavers nationally, but 
none acquired whole-body donations in New York or sent cadavers to New York 
programs. Among the programs licensed in New York to acquire and use cadavers, five 
were independent ventures, all located out of state. These ventures actively recruited 
donors in many states, particularly those with high concentrations of retirees, like 
Arizona and Florida, but none reported donations in New York. Though it is possible that 
unlicensed ventures might be sourcing in state, ventures were typically quite careful to 27 
 
obey prevailing laws to counter the stigma often associated with their pursuits. Thus it 
seems unlikely that unlicensed independent ventures sourced in the state. 
 
 The existence of a regional New York submarket was facilitated by the active transfer 
between academically housed programs of cadavers, thus reducing the need for these 
programs to look to other sources, including out-of-state sources, for specimens. Table 3 
provides an overview of the cadaver trades. In 2007, academically housed programs 
located in New York secured a total of 1,146 cadavers. Of these, 469 (41 percent) were 
transferred voluntarily to other academically housed programs. Though only a few 
programs had sufficiently ample supplies to distribute specimens, many programs 
benefited from their distribution. Nine in-state academically housed programs transferred 
cadavers they had acquired to other in-state recipients, and 70 percent (30 of the 43) of 
in-state academically housed programs received cadavers from another in-state program. 
[Insert Here Table 3] 
 
These transfers were voluntary and depended on programs’ willingness to part with 
specimens they had acquired. Regardless of the number of donations, no academically 
housed program ever had “spare” cadavers. Cadavers could always be put to good use—
for example, by lowering the number of students per cadaver in a class or by offering 
physicians advanced training in new procedures. Even so, some academically housed 
programs, the largest being referred to in state as “source” programs, voluntarily 
transferred cadavers to other programs, known as “recipients.” Recipient schools were 
aware that such transfers depended on the willingness of source schools to part with their 28 
 
resources. As one recipient-school professional explained, “I am sort of in a position of a 
beggar.” Source schools in turn reminded recipients that transfers were done at their 
discretion. The following quote is typical of the position of source programs: “I will be 
blunt: our school has no surplus. I do not supply all my [own] demands.” Sources schools 
were transferring cadavers at a cost. 
 
These cadaver transfers can be traced to the longstanding practice at some large programs 
of supplying smaller local institutions, which professionals at source schools called 
“community” or “affiliate” institutions. The term “affiliate” suggested a shared trajectory, 
but no formal connection linked the affiliate institutions and the programs that supplied 
them. For instance, a program housed in a large university regularly supplied two nearby 
community colleges with approximately five cadavers each per year. The community 
colleges, considered part of the “broader medical community” by the source program, 
trained nurse practitioners and physical therapists. Such local transfers were often 
referred to by the source schools as “social distributions.”  
 
These trade patterns created de facto a fairly insular commerce for cadavers in New 
York, thus achieving what most professionals hoped for, namely, the physical separation 
of their activities from those of independent ventures. In New York, transfers among 
programs ensured separate spheres on a fairly constant basis for specimens procured by 
academically housed programs and those procured by independent ventures. In other 
states, the goal of physical separation between spheres could be pursued mainly on a per-
program basis. For instance, as an out-of-state professional explained, “We do not allow 29 
 
our specimens to mix with other groups [of specimens].” In particular, he added, “I will 
not allow my specimens to be used with specimens from private brokers or for-profit 
ventures.” This physical distinction was less clear cut in the commerce in body parts. 
Four of the independent ventures licensed to operate in New York sent parts to in-state 
users, mostly for specialized training and research needs, such as continuing orthopedics-
surgery training and brain research. Despite some porosity between academically housed 
programs and independent ventures in the commerce for anatomical parts, the in-state 
commerce in cadavers remained fairly isolated from out-of-state trades, particularly 
trades with independent ventures. Such patterns of trade suggest an attempt to physically 
distinguish spheres of commerce within the broader commerce in cadavers. 
 
Professional Gatekeepers’ Role in Promoting Select Trades 
The insularity of commerce in New York was largely traceable to the efforts of a select 
group of in-state professionals to supply their peers. Despite legitimate internal demand 
for cadavers within their host institutions, these professionals chose to distribute some of 
their specimens to other institutions. In particular, the four in-state academically housed 
programs that each secured annually more than 100 cadavers transferred 54 percent of 
their supply (460 out of 852 cadavers) to other academically housed programs. Five 
smaller in-state academically housed programs also distributed some of their acquired 
specimens. It is noteworthy that all nine schools supplying their academic peers were part 
of the Anatomical Committee of the Associated Medical Schools of New York 
(AMSNY). The decisions to coordinate efforts at the state level and to extend the transfer 
of cadavers geographically beyond the confines of affiliate programs originated within 30 
 
this professional committee. AMSNY is a consortium of public and private medical 
schools. Its anatomical committee was created in 1975 to improve whole-body donation 
practices. Membership in the committee was by invitation and grew gradually over the 
years from four members at its inception to 11 by 1979, 15 by 1985, and 18 since 1988, 
as shown in Table 4. Over the past decade, the committee has promoted specimen 
transfers among its members by hosting yearly coordination meetings to discuss 
matching the supply of cadaver to the demand. By 2003, the committee had also started 
asking its members to voluntarily report annual cadaver transfers. 
 
The subgroup of New York academically housed programs that belong to AMSNY’s 
Anatomical Committee—those that I label “gatekeepers”—included only 18 of the 45 
non-transplant anatomic-bank sites licensed for the acquisition and use of cadavers and 
located in New York. This group nonetheless accounted for 68 percent of all cadavers 
acquired in state (1,146 out of 1,694) and for all cadavers voluntarily secured in state 
once the Chief Medical Examiner Office’s numbers are excluded. Moreover, committee 
members were responsible for all in-state transfers of cadavers. Importantly, all 
gatekeepers were holders of doctorates, mainly in anatomical sciences, physiology, or 
physical anthropology. The gatekeepers tended to voice points of view on commerce 
expressed by many other professionals at the annual conferences I attended.  
[Insert Here Table 4] 
 
Gatekeepers played a central role in promoting proper sourcing. All but one gatekeeper 
mentioned this as a goal of the consortium. As a typical gatekeeper explained, “We 31 
 
wanted to make sure no school in New York State was forced to go to unethical sources 
to get cadavers.” As another gatekeeper noted, “If we cannot supply the needs of all our 
members, we will force some to go outside and look for cadavers.” The existence of “less 
honorable” outsiders was perhaps best captured by a professional at a recipient school, 
who recalled his initial interactions with gatekeepers. In his words, “they wanted to get 
everybody, all of the schools in the state who either accept donations or use cadavers . . . 
to come together in that sort of blanket organization” and to make sure “that everything 
was done legitimately and above-board.” He explained the gatekeepers’ efforts as relating 
to concerns over “the way some of the things were being handled by certain less-than—
well, what am I trying to say?—less-than-honorable, I guess would be the best way to put 
it, persons at the time.” The honor or legitimacy of commerce was at stake. 
 
Gatekeepers were particularly concerned over the years about the need to regulate the 
commerce in cadavers. Yet freedom of interstate commerce prevented even receptive 
legislators from barring out-of-state ventures from operating in the state. Legislators did 
require ventures to register as licensed “non-transplant anatomic banks,” however, and 
most of the largest national ventures complied. Even so, gatekeepers were often 
disappointed by the lack of more stringent legislation. “The people who sell you houses 
are regulated,” explained one gatekeeper. “The people who make food for you are 
regulated. . . yet something as big and as important as body donations are not!” 
Concerned academically housed programs therefore took it on themselves to shape 
commerce via a group of like-minded peers. 
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The gatekeepers’ concerns were also partly self-serving. They mentioned their fears that 
unethical conduct would have a ripple effect on potential donors’ willingness to register, 
and ultimately on the supply of cadavers. They also invoked the need to maintain “public 
trust” and the likelihood that “public impression would probably govern the availability 
of bodies far more than any regulations would.” Scandals involving cadavers could have 
“an impact on all of us,” one gatekeeper noted, because potential donors would be “far 
less likely to actually go through with a donation if they think something illicit may be 
done.” Another gatekeeper pointed out that it would be to his own “benefit that there be 
no scandals involving anatomical materials at medical schools in New York State.” He 
added, if someone acts unethically “that could come back and bite,” and clarified, “So 
while, yes, you could say that it [transferring cadavers] was a good thing to do, it was 
also the right thing to do for our own programs.” Gatekeepers wanted, in effect, to protect 
their own sphere. 
 
Distinguishing Spheres of Commerce via Practices of Trade 
In addition to employing distinct narratives to describe the two spheres and maintaining a 
physical separation between spheres, gatekeepers also developed a set of practices for 
trading cadavers to defend their jurisdiction. The practices went beyond mere compliance 
with prevailing law. As one gatekeeper put it, certain practices might “strictly speaking, 
be legal, but that does not make them ethical.” These practices suggest how to trade 
cadavers properly and, by implication, how not to do so. Many trading practices, such as 
that of “never removing fingernail polish from a cadaver so medical students remember 
this cadaver is somebody,” were mentioned in interviews. Those mentioned by more than 33 
 
half the interviewed professionals are explained below and summarized in table 5. All 
programs run by professionals followed the “proper” practices described below for 
setting specimen users’ fees and prioritizing users’ needs, but these programs did not 
consistently follow practices relating to donor’s consent and the dissection of specimens. 
The fact that some programs did not enforce all practices did not undermine the collective 
pursuit; a full consensus, though desirable, was not needed to uphold their overall goals.  
 [Insert Here Table 5] 
 
Covering costs versus making a profit. Payment for services needed to secure 
specimens was an accepted practice among all interviewees working in academically 
housed programs or ventures. In line with the 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
guidelines, the “reasonable payment” by users to cover specific costs linked to 
procurement of a cadaver, such as transportation and embalming costs, could be invoiced 
by the source to the recipient program. Similar wording was included in the act’s 2006 
revision. In New York these costs amounted to approximately $1,500 per in-state 
transferred cadaver. There was little variation in cost between one academically housed 
source program and another, and costs were stable over time. As one typical gatekeeper 
explained, “We sat down and figured out all the expenses we have wrapped in this—the 
labor, the supplies, and the time factor involved. And we just got it [the cost] that way.”  
 
Charging procurement fees in excess of actual costs, though legal, was largely 
condemned at academically housed programs. Most professionals, particularly 
gatekeepers, viewed even modest profits with concern. Some believed that prevailing law 34 
 
banned any profit. “I am not allowed to make a profit,” one respondent explained. “All 
we do here is pass on the costs. I need to pay people who do the work for me. That’s it.” 
Most professionals, though aware of legal tolerance of some levels of profit, nevertheless 
considered pursuing profit to be unacceptable. “Programs in it for the money are a 
corrupting influence and need to be closed down,” one interviewee declared. Another 
speculated, “I could probably, if I wanted to, easily demonstrate that, you know, someone 
should be reimbursing us $2,000 a cadaver if I wanted to build that profit in, right? . . . 
That’s not happening as long as I have something to say about it.” This stance was widely 
shared among professionals. “Some people do it for money,” another typical advocate of 
closing profit-driven programs noted, “but many folks do not understand that money will 
be made on grandma.” Only covering procurement costs was deemed appropriate. 
  
A desire to expose what they called the “deceit” of some independent ventures also 
informed the gatekeepers’ practices. In particular, the ventures registered as non-profit 
organizations, it was noted, still made profits; “they only reinvest them in the venture.” 
The following quote captures this stance: “There are many non-profit companies that 
manipulate perceptions. Their non-profit status has nothing to do with the work of God 
[or charitable work]. Many people are misled by this non-profit term.” Overall, 
professionals distinguished between their own programs and ventures by noting that the 
former made no profit. The habit of earning “legally accepted levels” of profits was not 
considered an option by gatekeepers or by the vast majority of professionals. 
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Obtaining donors’ versus families’ consent. In all U.S. states, including New 
York, a cadaver can legally be donated, after death, without the deceased’s explicit prior 
consent. Such legislation is meant to generate a sufficient supply of cadavers for the 
needs of medical education and research. All states permit donations by immediate next 
of kin (spouses, parents, adult siblings, and adult children). In all but one state, the law 
also allows for donations by guardians; in half the states, individuals unrelated to the 
deceased, such as a public-health officer or a chief medical examiner—those likely to 
handle unclaimed cadavers—can consent to donation. 
 
Though acquisition of unclaimed cadavers and those donated by family members was 
legal in most states, few interviewed professionals relied on this acquisition channel. 
Local legislation in only a few small geographic regions of New York barred such 
acquisitions. Yet cadavers acquired this way in all other geographies were generally 
deemed inappropriate; the vast majority of academically housed programs required prior 
direct consent of the deceased.
4 As one gatekeeper explained, “First of all, we require the 
individual to be signed up themselves [in other words, not by others] prior to death.” 
Such programs maintained lists of registered donors to ensure that “proper” consent had 
been obtained and donors were also asked to discuss their wishes with family members. 
In most instances, potential donors had submitted consent forms years before death to 
ensure that their wishes to donate their body to science would be followed. As further 
evidence of discomfort with family donations, the rare professionals that relied in part on 
family donations often exhibited a need to justify their practices. For instance, a 
professional who obtained approximately 70 percent of his specimens via individual 36 
 
consent but complemented that supply with family donations minimized the stigma 
attached to the practice. In his words, the latter donors “might have talked about it with 
family members, but they just never signed the forms,” thus allowing him to partly 
normalize his actions. 
 
By contrast, the professionals noted that independent ventures were in the habit of 
approaching families, rather than donors, in their efforts to obtain consent. Interviews 
with ventures partially confirmed that perception: approaching family members was the 
preferred way to secure donations in the initial years of operations. “In our first few 
years,” one venture staff member noted, “80 percent of specimens came via family, not 
donor, consent.” With time, however, the same ventures began compiling their own lists 
of potential donors and increasingly obtained consent from the future donor, not his or 
her family. This gradual shift did not prevent ventures from still approaching relatives of 
potential donors, particularly the gravely ill, to explain the process of “donating a body to 
science.” Independent ventures typically employed “development” staff conducting 
outreach efforts to hospitals’ and hospices’ populations, including chaplains, to help 
locate potentially amenable donors or relatives. 
 
Professionals’ views on what constitutes proper consent (i.e., direct donor consent) were 
also embodied in their practice of generally not engaging in commerce with the Office of 
the Chief Medical Examiner. In 2007, for instance, the office offered 548 cadavers to 
academically housed programs in all five Manhattan boroughs.
5 These cadavers had 
always been identified by family members, but not claimed; they were therefore 37 
 
technically unclaimed, though not anonymous, and were therefore akin to donations with 
families’ consent. Despite the office’s practice of only releasing identified cadavers to 
academically housed programs, only 74 such cadavers were accepted by four 
academically housed programs (including members of the AMSNY’s Anatomical 
Committee). Another 175 went to an embalming school, and the remaining 299 went 
unused. The condition of specimens was occasionally cited as a reason to reject 
unclaimed cadavers, but this was not the sole reason for the professionals’ reluctance to 
accept them. A rare professional who accepted such specimens noted that the specimens 
were often useable. “I always tell my colleagues that they need to go there to find 
specimens, but I do not understand why they don’t. I often am the only one responding to 
a call by the chief medical examiner. All of them should be running there to find 
specimens.” Instead, most professionals, though they needed cadavers and were located 
near one of the office’s five sites, relied on more distant academically housed programs 
to fill their needs. 
 
Most professionals expressed normative reluctance to use unclaimed cadavers, as 
exemplified by the following typical comment from one professional not working with 
the morgue. In the past, he explained, the organization that was supplying him with 
cadavers “occasionally got the cadavers from unclaimed bodies, I think in the New York 
City area.” Though he knew the practice was legal, “that’s a little less respectable 
because those people didn’t make a donation. Those people died as transients and then 
subsequently their bodies were given away, so to speak, by the city morgue.” In his 38 
 
words, this was an improper “means” of acquiring cadavers. Only direct donor consent 
was the “honorable” way to operate. 
 
Prioritizing versus answering needs. All three versions of the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act (1968, 1987, 2006) have specified the intended use of anatomical 
specimens, namely, for transplantation or therapy. Though the acts regulate use of 
anatomical specimens for these purposes only, they have been widely regarded as 
applying to other intents as well. In particular, all of the programs (including ventures) 
that used specimens for medical education and research viewed themselves as operating 
under the UAGA rules. But not all medical education and research intents were deemed 
equally worthy by interviewed professionals who made it a habit of screening cadaver 
requests for intent. The gatekeepers articulated a particularly narrow hierarchy of 
acceptable uses, with the development of the medical profession as a priority. 
 
The highest priority for gatekeepers was basic anatomical teaching needs, mainly the 
training of first- and second-year medical students. One staff member of a large source 
program explained that while colleagues “cannot teach their introductory gross anatomy 
course…I am not going to send cadavers to any institutions for a post-graduate training 
course, a research program, continuous medical education or anything like that. That is 
not going to happen.” The needs of other physicians-in-training were a secondary 
priority. Residents in surgery, emergency medical training, ob-gyn, and the like were also 
considered priority recipients. Next in line were allied health professionals, such as 
physical-therapy students and physician assistants, but only once the needs of medical 39 
 
students had been filled, because there were not “enough specimens to go around.” In 
addition, undergraduate courses were sometimes deemed acceptable recipients, but some 
professionals imposed more restrictions on such uses. The rule that “only people going 
for a state-licensure-affiliated health degree can touch a cadaver” often applied. 
 
The more contested intended use of cadavers in medical education was in “clinical 
courses” and ad-hoc continuing-medical-education seminars. The latter category often 
proved somewhat variable in content. For instance, it included both short training 
programs aimed at certifying practicing physicians and training in the use of company-
specific medical devices, although the former were deemed more appropriate than the 
latter. The reasoning behind such contestation was articulated by a typical gatekeeper 
while describing the latter use: “We do not deal with private companies like Johnson & 
Johnson. But if a physician in our medical school sponsors a class and J&J foots the bill, 
then we are OK. As long as our faculty members are the ones requesting specimens, we 
trust them to advance medical education and research.” The “big companies” were left to 
acquire “lots of their materials” from the independent ventures, with often less stringent 
criteria for intended use.
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Finally, most professionals were united in their condemnation of the “traveling body 
exhibit,” an atypical but highly visible use of cadavers. “This is the worst,” one 
interviewee explained. “Putting bodies into traveling exhibits is just wrong. It’s all for 
show and play, something for the Middle Ages.” Though a few representatives of 
academically housed programs saw “some educational purpose” in these exhibits, they 40 
 
were repeatedly compared unfavorably with the medical education and research pursued 
in their programs. No professional stated that she would allow her specimens to be used 
in such a manner. 
 
Respecting versus processing a cadaver. The question of a cadaver’s integrity 
arose at two specific junctures in commerce: at the outset, in the case of preparing 
acquired specimens, and often post-use, when cremating remains. No state law or legal 
ruling specified that cadavers needed to be kept whole. In fact, legislators had never 
addressed this practical issue. Post-use cremation practices elicited broad agreement 
among professionals, but interpretations of proper conduct varied with respect to initial 
preparation of the specimens. 
 
Post-use cremation practices among professionals were mainly guided by the desire to 
preserve the integrity of remains. They expended much effort to ensure that used 
cadavers (and occasionally parts) were returned to the source program for cremation, and 
gatekeepers asked their staff to report the number of cadavers returned each year to 
source programs. Even so, the threshold of integrity could at times be open to debate. For 
instance, temporal bones were occasionally deemed integral to the body and sometimes 
not. One professional “asked them back from users, so we can cremate them with the 
rest.” Another program “usually let the specimen users dispose [of] them. . . . Since 
nothing is left but bone dust, we consider this disposable material.” Despite such 
definitional variation, most professionals aimed to preserve the integrity of cadavers 
when cremating remains. Some independent ventures also adhered to the same practice. 41 
 
 
By contrast, with regard to a cadaver’s integrity prior to use, the two spheres of 
commerce differed starkly. All interviewed staff members of ventures noted that 
dissection prior to use was the norm in their operations. The vast majority of interviewed 
professionals opposed dissection of cadavers prior to use and provided normative reasons 
for their position. The comment that “cutting bodies up and distributing parts is not what 
we are about” captured these respondents’ position. As one professional put it, “Some 
programs say the body will be segmented. Let’s be clear: that means processed! They 
basically remove all but the head and the hands. . . . I worry about that.” Another 
professional clarified, “we are not in the business of distributing partial remains.” A third 
added, “There are places that want just a certain part of the body, and I don’t feel very 
comfortable cutting the body up and sending it all over the place. . . . I would rather not 
cut the body up [and] respect a cadaver.” For professionals, preserving a cadaver’s 
integrity prior to use was seen as a form of respect, although practical considerations also 
occasionally guided some professionals’ views. For instance, two professionals cited the 
potential difficulty of tracking body parts. 
 
Even though most professionals did not dissect cadavers prior to use—a practice also 
shared by the majority of gatekeepers, a few professionals at large programs, particularly 
in source programs in New York, endorsed the practice. They believed strongly in 
maximizing specimen use by sending parts, not just whole cadavers, to users. The same 
interviewees usually also encouraged re-use of specimens and parts when possible. In 
particular, when a donor proved unsuitable for an anatomy course (e.g., due to obesity), 42 
 
dissection prior to use was deemed appropriate. “If a donor is not suitable, then I harvest 
from the cadaver and get specific parts, such as arms, legs, et cetera,” one interviewee 
explained. “You can find seventy different purposes for each of these parts.” 
 
DISCUSSION 
The legitimizing efforts deployed by professionals and independent ventures’ staff in 
securing cadavers constituted an interaction order in which alternate meanings of 
commerce were at stake. From a traditional acceptation involving mainly local sourcing 
and a fairly esoteric professional knowledge, the U.S. commerce in cadavers evolved to 
become an entrepreneurial pursuit spanning the entire country and requiring 
organizational rather than professional expertise. Moreover, independent ventures 
achieved a partial “commodification” of the traditional professional activities linked to 
securing cadavers by transforming these activities into commodities, which could then be 
bought and sold without the involvement of jurisdictional professions (Abbott, 1988: 
146). Staff members of academically housed programs, mostly trained medical 
professionals with a Ph.D., were suddenly confronted with an alternate view of their 
activities—a view that relied on new ways of upholding expertise (i.e., organization and 
commodification) directly competing with the older professional system (Abbott, 1988: 
324). 
 
The contest over the meaning, and ultimately the legitimacy of commerce, was not being 
waged through legitimizing all cadaver trades, but in practices undertaken at the bottom 
of consent forms, in programs’ profit-and-loss balance sheets, in priority cues of 43 
 
specimen-users’ demands, and on dissection tables upon receipt of cadavers. The struggle 
between legitimate and illegitimate commerce and its associated jurisdictional dispute 
were about practices of trade involving “similar” goods. The issue was not whether 
cadavers (as a category of goods) or only a subset of cadavers (New York specimens) 
could be traded, but how cadavers should be traded in order for commerce to occur.  The 
“character” of the profession (Abbott, 1988: 190) was seen in essence as intertwined with 
the ways trading activities were performed. Whether potential donors and their families 
were persuaded by the professionals’ character remains to be seen, but professionals were 
able to develop among themselves a relatively shared understanding of morals. 
 
In keeping with the importance of classification and distinction in sustaining morality 
(Durkheim and Mauss, 1903; Needham, 1973; Douglas, 1986, 2002), the professionals 
promoted a view of commerce requiring several “tests” (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999, 
2006) that had to be met in practice to render commerce legitimate. First, accepting only 
specimens originating in-state and from other academically housed programs suggested 
legitimacy, but origin was not a sufficient criterion for legitimacy. Obtaining a donor’s 
direct consent, asking for reimbursement of only the procurement costs, prioritizing 
users’ needs, and refusing to dissect a cadaver prior to use formed a set of practices more 
strongly pointing toward moral legitimacy. The narrative framing of trades did not suffice 
to shape morals. Instead, practices of trade helped professionals specify and defend their 
jurisdiction and the legitimacy of their pursuit. 
 44 
 
By contrast, the independent ventures championed a view of commerce that centered on 
catering to specimen-users’ needs and on the belief of engaging in an extensive use of 
cadavers, in essence, creating contest and dissonance among market participants (Kaplan, 
2008; Stark, 2009). Such a view justified securing, if needed, donations from family 
members (not donors) and dissecting cadavers prior to use to allow as many users as 
possible to benefit from cadavers. Reasonable profits (above and beyond costs) were seen 
as normal means to achieve these ends. In that spirit, the ventures’ staff viewed the 
professionals’ unwillingness to answers all users’ demands (via priority cues) more as 
evidence of their limited organizational capability than of the legitimacy of their 
endeavor. 
 
Because some professionals in New York, those that I labeled gatekeepers, were able to 
institutionalize their perspective on commerce via the control and coordinated 
distribution of “proper” specimens to other academically housed programs, their 
perspective was fairly consistently enforced. By accepting the “social distribution” of 
specimens, other professionals implicitly accepted the social contract attached to them, 
namely, following proper practices of trade. While lower sourcing costs might have also 
influenced the recipient programs’ decisions, the aspiration to belong to a legitimate 
sphere of commerce was probably as central, if not more so, to their decisions. 
 
Contribution to the Institutional Literature 
This study’s findings challenge a central assumption of the institutional view on morals 
and markets by shifting the focus of moral assessment away from the good itself toward 45 
 
the practice of trade. The institutional view supports the moral stance as reluctance to 
trade certain categories of goods (Caprom and Radin, 1988; Anderson, 1995; Carruthers 
and Espeland, 1998). This study shows that how trades are conducted can also render 
markets moral and explains the “anomalous” occurrences of legitimate markets in 
improper goods. As such, the study answers calls to examine how “contested 
constructions of normative models” guide the institutional organizing process (Scott, 
2001: 118) and explores the “workings of various sources of legitimacy” (Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008: 68), thus providing insight into the micro-foundations of institutions 
(Powell and Colyvas, 2008) and how institutions are inhabited (Hallett and Ventresca, 
2006). Though the categorical criterion remains a useful shortcut for moral guidance, this 
study suggests that a taboo on trading certain goods may be an excessively conservative 
device to guard against immoral markets. A ban on all trades in improper goods might 
prevent some properly executed trades from being conducted. Assuming that proper 
practices of trade can be enforced, the focus on categories of goods might give way to a 
more practice-based view of moral markets—one relying on practices of trade to guide 
moral action—at least for market participants. 
 
The view of grounding legitimacy in practices echoes the position of pragmatic 
philosophers, such as Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey, that individuals solve problems 
by relying on practical habits that include “coherent repertoires” for acting vis-à-vis a set 
of given problems (Gross, 2009: 371). Other scholars have also repeatedly noted that the 
collective enactment of practices over time can produce and reproduce social order and 
meanings (Ortner, 1984; de Certeau, 1988; Bourdieu, 1990; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Swidler, 46 
 
2001). In given markets, communities of practices can, for instance, pave the way for 
guiding social action and for moral legitimacy to emerge (Lave, 1988; Lave and Wenger, 
1991; Orr, 1996). The practice-based view of moral markets builds on these literatures, 
alongside those on professions, by calling for close attention to participants’ practical 
responses to given market situations involving the same category of goods as ways to 
gain legitimacy. 
 
An implication of such a practice-based view of moral markets is that markets 
traditionally seen as uniformly moral or immoral can include spheres or sub markets, 
each with its own morality, that are distinguished along lines of practices. Thus the 
question of whether any given market is moral might be misguided. The question can 
only apply to sub markets. This also implies that markets in goods that are usually 
deemed legitimate to trade can lose their moral legitimacy when such trades are 
conducted improperly. This point is well illustrated by the recent U.S. crisis involving 
home mortgages. Some data suggest that loan-generation practices were increasingly out 
of keeping with loan officers’ longstanding norms (de Michelis, 2009: 6). Further 
research might focus on common practice-based distinctions in spheres across markets to 
identify potential classes of practices that point toward the construction of legitimacy. 
Typical classes of practices might, for instance, entail ones upholding distinct 
participants’ rights (e.g., donors’ vs. specimen users’ or borrowers’ vs. lenders’) or 
favoring varying scopes of beneficiaries (e.g., society vs. individual entrepreneurs or 
nations vs. financial institutions). Research designs across markets and spheres would 
allow for clearer cataloging and a better understanding of classes of “moral” practices. 47 
 
 
Contribution to the Strategic Literature 
The literature adopting a strategic view on legitimacy also partly fails to distinguish or 
explain variations in levels of moral legitimacy in different trades involving the same 
category of goods (Zelizer, 1979, 1985; Barley, 1983 Sanal, 2004; Quinn, 2008; Chan, 
2009a, 2009b). This study suggests that participants’ legitimizing efforts can be directed 
toward only select trades. We already know that a given market can harbor distinct 
“circuits of commerce” (Zelizer, 2005) in which goods that appear to be similar can take 
on very different cultural meanings and that those meanings can vary depending on forms 
of payment as well as the recipients of pay (Zelizer, 1985: 169-207). But those circuits 
can also entail contrasted morals: in that sense, circuits for “fair” vs. “unfair” blood or 
“ethical” vs. “unethical” organs can coexist. Although past research on markets has 
focused on their subdivisions (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; Rao, Monin and Durand, 
2003; Phillips and Owens, 2004; Hsu, 2006; Weber, Heinze and deSoucey, 2008; Negro, 
Hannan and Rao, 2010), it has largely steered clear of considering moral subdivisions or 
discussed moral branding within a market. For example, not all trades in mortgage-
backed securities might be morally equivalent. Further studies might identify the 
conditions under which such moral categorization emerges. The absence of a central 
authority enforcing an agreement among participants and participants’ lack of prior social 
ties have been posited to encourage the emergence of (moral) categorization (Zelizer, 
2010: 307). A market’s audiences might be an added dimension to consider when 
examining such emergence and the shaping of the moral debates. As an example, markets 
with small, peer-based audiences might prove more amenable to moral distinctions. By 48 
 
contrast, markets with large, diverse audiences might lend themselves less to such 
distinctions. 
 
This study also contributes to the strategic literature by highlighting the role of practice 
avoidance in sustaining legitimacy. The strategic literature recognizes the importance of 
practice adoption in shaping legitimacy (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; Rao, Monin 
and Durand, 2003; Phillips and Owens, 2004; Hsu, 2006; Kennedy and Fiss, 2009; 
Negro, Hannan and Rao, 2010), but has less explored the role of systematic practice 
avoidance in this same construction (e.g., avoiding dissecting a cadaver prior to use). 
Distinctions are seen as providing the basic building blocks of social life and sustaining 
salient boundaries that help, in turn, to define communities (Lamont, 1992, 2000; Lamont 
and Molnár, 2002; Rao, Monin and Durand, 2005). As Douglas (2002: 5) noted, ideas 
about separating or demarcating impose “system on an inherently untidy experience.” By 
extension, the absence of strong distinctions is said to lead to a crisis of identity 
(Douglas, 1986: 96). This implies that the ability to identify impurity is inherent to the 
moral pursuit: knowing how not to trade is as important as knowing how to trade. The 
harvesting of genetic material illustrates this point well. Refraining from reimbursing 
consequent travel costs (e.g., plane tickets) to individuals who have agreed to provide 
genetic material is deemed proper practice, and individuals expect only a “token” 
recognition of inconvenience (Ertman, 2009: 1033). It is not only what is done but also 
what is not done (here, not paying for consequent travel costs) that sustains legitimacy. 
Further research might identify practices that are systematically avoided across markets 
to document and explain common limits to markets. 49 
 
 
Contribution to the Literature on Professions 
Another contribution of this study is to highlight the role of morals as legitimizing 
devices for professions. In the twentieth century, “character [i.e., morals] lost much 
ground” as the basis for legitimizing professional work domains (Abbott, 1988: 191). 
With the recent rise of contested markets in such diverse domains as agriculture, finance, 
and medicine, professional character might regain some of its lost ground (see Khurana, 
2007, for such a discussion). Professions clearly do not epitomize morality, and they 
“seize all sorts of human activities, not just the moral ones” (Abbott, 1988: 324). 
Professions nonetheless tend to enforce some sense of order on activities (Durkheim, 
1964; Freidson, 1994). The gradual inclusion in commerce of goods previously deemed 
off limits to trade might therefore offer new opportunities for professions to test their 
ordering capacity. In such instances, professional boundary work involving moral claims 
will almost certainly intensify (Gieryn, 1983, 1999). Though character has historically 
grounded many professions, its role in sustaining contemporary professional legitimacy 
remains to be more fully explored. As an illustration, the recent development in the 
United States of paid emergency medical technicians (EMTs) alongside traditional 
volunteer EMTs offers a window into how morals can justify professional pursuits 
(Nelsen and Barley, 1997). While volunteer EMTs viewed themselves as altruists drawn 
from the local community, paid EMTs gradually positioned themselves as public servants 
able to systematically rise above the sensationalism of the task and assist all patients, not 
just the ones involved in the most traumatic events. Volunteer EMTs were depicted as 
“trauma junkies” and paid EMTs as the ones dedicated to a larger social good (Nelsen 50 
 
and Barley, 1997: 7). In the process, paid EMTs were able to claim higher moral ground 
than the volunteers. Future research might want to shed light on the conditions (besides 
jurisdictional disputes) under which professional morals might gain saliency.  
 
This study also suggests considering more broadly the layered foundations of 
professional “character” or morals. Morals are often presented as one form of 
jurisdictional settlement (Abbott, 1988: 69-79). When considering jurisdictional 
settlements, character is also seen as competing with other legitimizing strategies, such as 
technical legitimacy (Abbott, 1988: 191), but such a view misses the tight interplay 
between morals and practices (or techniques). Studies on the conduct of British naval 
officers and North American zookeepers both exemplify such an interplay. During the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, British naval officers were socialized into being 
“gentlemen” by learning how to intercept foreign ships (Elias, 2007: 30-31). The proper 
steps they followed for interceptions sustained and reflected their character. Likewise, 
North American zookeepers’ current embrace of practices aimed at breeding captive 
animals are tightly aligned with their moral duty to protect endangered species 
(Bunderson and Thompson, 2009: 40). Future research might consider examining the 
interplay between character and other legitimizing strategies across multiple settings. 
Mutual reinforcement, rather than competition, between legitimizing strategies within a 
profession might be the norm. In addition, research designs distinguishing between 
profession-specific bases of morals and broader cultural bases of morals would advance 
our understanding of the foundations of morals. As an example, the perceived legitimacy 
of commerce in kidneys has been shown to be partly associated with trust or distrust of 51 
 
markets more generally (Leider and Roth, 2010). Likewise, the legitimacy of commerce 
in cadavers might have benefited from a growing legitimacy of markets more generally in 
contemporary society. Closer attention therefore needs to be paid to the internal as well 
as the external foundations of character in professions. 
 
Given the preeminence of markets in society (Hirschman, 1982; Fourcade-Gourinchas 
and Healy, 2007; Sandel, 2009) and assuming that markets “construct society” (Fourcade, 
2007: 1019), it is crucial to better understand how markets are rendered morally 
legitimate. Though the commerce in cadavers is an extreme setting in which to study 
markets, the relationship between practices of trade and professions and morality is likely 
to apply to other markets as well, such as “fair” trade or “ethical” investing. Practices of 
trade can be thought of as the products of long, chaotic chains of decisions. At the same 
time, practices are frequently rooted in professional conduct and constitute an integral 
facet of the market and its morals. Although the category of traded goods is generally 
considered when assessing a market’s moral legitimacy, it only constitutes a starting 
point. A market’s legitimacy is also defined by how trades are conducted. In a practice-
based view of moral markets, legitimate trades in improper goods and illegitimate trades 
in proper goods are not aberrations. Instead, they are at the forefront of contestation over 
meanings of commerce—a front that is likely to grow with the spread of markets in our 
society. 52 
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1 One independent venture had links with a continuing-medical-education training facility, but the majority 
of such ventures operate independently.  
2 In only one instance was the distinction between spheres described in health terms, suggesting that the 
safety norms adopted by the independent ventures might prove less stringent than those adopted by the 
academically housed programs. Hepatitis and HIV testing, for instance, were routine in both spheres.  
3 The scandal referred to occurred at UCLA in 2004 (see Madigan, 2004, for details). 
4 The main exception is the Maryland State Anatomy Board, which accepted unclaimed cadavers. 
5 New York Public Health Law (article 4211) specifies that unclaimed cadavers are to be delivered to 
“schools for study” and “schools” encompass a broad range of teaching institutions.  
6 An archival study of shipping invoices at a typical independent venture confirmed that for-profit 
companies were a major category of specimen recipients (Anteby and Hyman, 2008: 967). 1 
 
Table 1 
Profile of Non-Transplant Anatomical Banks in New York, 2007 
 
Category  Number of license 
holders 
Number of in- 
state License 
Holders 
Example of license holders 
Academically housed program
*   45   43  
 
Mercy College 
New York University 
University of Rochester 
Independent venture  5   0  Anatomy Gifts Registry 
Life Legacy Foundation 
Science Care  
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner   1   1  Bronx location 
Queens location 
Medical-devices manufacturer   1   1  Ellman Innovations  
Private orthopedics practice   1   1  Orthopedics Associates  
 
*  The two academically housed programs located out of state were the Maryland State Anatomy Board, housed at the University of 
Maryland, and the Robert Wood Johnson Medical School at the University of Medicine and Dentistry in New Jersey.  2 
 
Table 2 
Details of Interviewees 
 
Category of interviewees  Number of 
interviewees 
Licensed in New 
York State 
Located in New 
York State
* 
Academically housed programs  38  24  23 
Independent ventures  4  3  0 
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner  1  1  1 
Industry insiders  5  0  0 
Total  48  28 (58%)  24 (50%) 
 
* Interviewees from nine of the 23 in-state-licensed and located academically housed programs were among the gatekeepers described below.  
 
 3 
 
Table 3 
Overview of New York License Holders’ Cadaver Trades, 2007 
 
Category 
(number of programs) 
Cadavers 
acquired 
independently 
Cadavers used 
in-house 
Cadavers 
transferred to users 
located in New York  
Academically housed programs (45)  1,717  1,455  500 
Out-of-state academically housed programs (2)  571  266  31 
Independent ventures (5)  3,466  80  0 
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (1)  548  0  249 
Other
* (2)  0  0  0 
Total for license holders located in New York (44)  1,694  1,189  718 
Total for all license holders (53)  5,731  1,535  749 
 
* This category included a medical device manufacturer and a private orthopedic practice, both with no activity in 2007. 
 4 
 
Table 4 
Members of AMSNY’s Anatomical Committee, 2007 
 
Program  
 
   
Year 
joined 
Cadavers 
acquired 
independently 
Cadavers 
used  
in-house 
Cadavers 
transferred to 
users located 
in New York  
Albany Medical College  1988  239  70  180 
Albert Einstein College of Medicine  1979  53  63  0 
Columbia University
*  1979  43  56  0 
CUNY  1978  0  20  0 
Mount Sinai School of Medicine  1975  37  56  0 
New York Chiropractic College  1977  0  40  0 
New York College of Osteopathic Medicine  1977  0  53  1 
New York Medical College  1975  30  40  2 
New York University School of Medicine†  1978  30  39  1 
Stony Brook University Medical Center  1980  74  72  2 
SUNY at Buffalo  1975  294  197  97 
SUNY Downstate Medical Center
*  1979  16  60  3 
SUNY Upstate Medical Center  1988  183  79  120 
University of Rochester  1980  136  80  63 
Weill Cornell Medical College  1975  11  50  0 
Total    1,146  975  469 
 
* These programs both possessed two licenses but only a single committee membership. For example, 
Columbia University’s Department of Anatomy and Cell Biology and its Department of Orthopedic 
Surgery had separate licenses, but only one representative of Columbia University sat on the Committee. 
†	 ﾠNew York University’s College of Dentistry had a separate AMSNY membership but did not report 
activity in 2007.5 
 
Table 5  
Comparison of Main Practices of Trade 
 
Dimensions of 
comparison 
Reminder of the legal 
provision 
Practices most academically housed 
programs’ staff perceive as legitimate 
Practices most independent ventures’ staff 
perceive as legitimate 
Payments and profits  Reasonable payment to allay 
procurement costs is legal. 
Requesting reimbursement by the user of only 
the procurement costs. 
 
Making a profit by asking user to reimburse 
costs above the procuring costs. 
Consent  Potential donors, families, 
and other identified parties 
(e.g., a medical examiner) 
can consent to a donation. 
 
Obtaining donors’ direct consent to secure 
donations. 
 
Obtaining families’ consent (without donors’ 
direct consent) to secure donations. 
 
Intended use  The law provides no explicit 
guidelines on use for 
educational and research 
purposes. 
Prioritizing specimen-users’ needs by: 
- Serving medical students’ anatomical needs 
first, particularly the needs of first-year 
medical students; 
- Serving the anatomical needs of other 
health-related medical professionals once 
medical students’ needs are served; 
- Serving continuing-education anatomical 
needs once students’ needs are served; 
- Serving medical research anatomical needs; 
- Not serving the anatomical needs of for-
profit companies. 
 
Serving all medical-education and training 
anatomical needs, including the needs of for-
profit companies.  
Integrity of the 
cadaver 
The law provides no explicit 
guidelines on the integrity of 
a cadaver. 
Refraining from dissecting a cadaver prior to 
use. 
 
Dissecting a cadaver upon receipt and prior 
to use to distribute parts to multiple users. 
 